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Introduction
In the five years since the events of 11 September 2001, we have seen an
lmprecedented number of Commonwealth and State Acts passed based on
the supposed view that they are necessary in order to combat the threat of
terrorism. Such Acts have the potential, depending on how they are
interpreted by our courts, to greatly impact on the kind of society that we
live in, and challenge long held fundamental common law rights and
liberties that Australians tend to take for granted. Of course, the question
of balancing community protection on the one hand with preserving civil
liberties that go to the heart of the nature of our society on the other is a
matter for Parliament. However, given our long tradition of judicial
review in Australia it is submitted that the High COUli has a role to play in
assessing the constitutional validity of such measures,l and indirectly in
upholding civil liberties, particularly in the absence of an express Bill of
Rights in the Australian Constitution. The wliter submits that some of the
aspects of the recent anti-terrorism legislation might find some objections
in the High Court.
A fmiher complication for the Federal Government in this context is the
ability of the defence power to support the raft of legislation enacted post
2001. Of course, the defence power is at its greatest during times of
'war'. In the past, whether or not Australia was at 'war' has been an easy
question to answer - Australia was clearly at 'war' during both of the
World Wars. It is not so easy to say that Australia is at 'war' post 2001
when the exact enemy or enemies is sometimes unclear, and where there
has been no actual declaration of war. If there is a 'war' it is also unlike
previous wars in that it is not based on geographical boundaries (and
hence easy to categorise), but on belief systems that transcend borders,
countries and continents. 2
2
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Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1; MarbUlY v Madison
(1803) 1 Cranch 137, 2 Law Ed 135.
Some argue that the 'terrorism threat' has been deliberately overstated by the
Government: see for example Michael Head 'Counter-Terrorism Laws: A Threat to
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Ambit of This Enquiry
Others have clitiqued the terrorism laws in totality3 and this author will
not revisit that ground. This article will focus only on the controversial
provisions of the National Security Information (Criminal and Civil
Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth)4 relating to offences to which national
security might be relevant. /
Summary of Procedural Provisions for Trials for Offences
Which Relate to National Security
The Federal Government has recognised the difficulty that sometimes the
evidence needed to prosecute a person accused of offences relating to
national security, including most obviously ten-orism or related offences,
is of a highly sensitive nature and in some cases cannot in fact be used in
an open court. 5 As a result it has introduced a celiificate system for the
disclosure of classified infonnation.
Section 24 of the National Security Iriformation Act requires that if a
prosecutor or defendant knows or believes that during federal criminal
proceedings they will disclose information that relates to or may affect
national security, or that a witness will do so, they must as soon as
possible give the Attorney General written notice of that belief. 6 It is
interesting that the legislation on its face is very broad, applying to all
federal criminal proceedings, 7 rather than terrorism offences, the issue
which presumably created the momentum for the law being introduced. 8
3
4
6
7
Political Freedom, Civil Liberties and Constitutional Rights' (2002) 26 Melbourne
University Law Review 666.
Christopher Michaelsen 'Anti-Terrorism Legislation in Australia: A Proportionate
Response to the Terrorist Threat?' (2005) 28 Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 321;
Bernadette McSherry 'Terrorism Offences in the Criminal Code: Broadening the
Boundaries of Australian Criminal Laws' (2004) 27(2) University ofNew South Wales
Law Journal 354; and Joo-Cheong Tham 'Casualties of the Domestic War on Terror:
A Review of Recent Counter-Terrorism Laws' (2004) 28 Melbourne University Lmv
Review 512.
Hereafter National Security IYl!onnation Act.
R v Lappas and Dowling [2005] ACTSC 115 (unreported 26 November 2001) (note
that this case is an espionage case rather than one involving terrorism).
The notice must be in writing, and must inClude the document or extract from it that
contains the information or, if unavailable, a description of the information. The
notifYing party must then let the court and the other party to the action know they have
given such notice: s 24(2) and (3). Section 24 only operates in the prosecutions
brought after the Act commenced, where the prosecutor gives notice that the Act
applies to the proceeding.
This phrase is broadly defined in ss 13-14 to mean criminal proceedings where an
offence against any law of the COl11l11onwealth is alleged. It includes bail, committal,
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If a witness is asked a question, and the prosecutor or defendant knows or
believes that information in the answer relates to or may affect national
security, that person must notify the court immediately. 9 The court will
then adjourn the proceeding and hold a closed hearing. At this time, the
witness must give the court a written answer to the question, which will
be shown to the prosecutor. If the prosecutor knows or believes that the
answer relates to or may affect national security, they must immediately
advise the court of that belief, and give the Attorney General notice of
that belief. 10
Once the notice is given to the Attorney General, a party to the
proceedings who discloses that infonnation, where that disclosure is
likely to prejudice national security, is liable to imprisonment for two
years. ll
Once the Attorney General has notice as per either path mentioned above,
or for any reason expects that any of the s 24 circumstances will arise, he
or she may decide that disclosure of the information would be likely to
prejudice national security. If so, the Attorney General may issue a
certificate that limits the use of the infonnation to particular situations. If
the information is in a document, the Attorney General may return the
document with the relevant information deleted, either with or without a
summary of the information. 12 The effect of the certificate is that it is
conclusive evidence that disclosure of the information in the proceeding
is likely to prejudice national securitY,13 until the matter is heard by the
comi. If the Attorney General believes that a potential witness will
disclose information by his or her mere presence in the proceeding,
sentencing and appeal proceedings, pre-trial proceedings, as well as discovery,
inspection or disclosure of intended evidence. .
This generality may be because Kirby J in Nicholas v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 173
said that the more specific legislation was in tenns of its applicability to particular
situations, the more likely it was to amount to a breach of separation of powers (at 260-
261).
9 National Security Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth) s
25(2).
10 National Security Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth) s
25(6).
11 National Security b1formation (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth) s
40(1); similar provisions apply to the answering of questions (s 40(2», and where the
mere presence of a person will disclose infonnation in a manner likely to prejudice
national security (s 41).
12 Separate provision is made for the case where the infonnation is or is not in the fonn
of a document - refer to National Security Iriformation (Criminal and Civil
Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth) s 26.
13 National Security Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth) s
27(1).
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he/she may issue a certificate to the effect that the prosecutor or
defendant must not call that witness. 14 It is an offence to disclose
information contrary to the Attorney General's non-disclosure celiificate
or call a witness contrary to the Attorney General's witness exclusion
certificate. 15
'Closed hearing requirements' apply to hearings where the court has been
advised that a witness may disclose information about or affecting
national security, or where the court is considering making a non-
disclosure order in relation to the information. In closed hearing cases, s
30 allows the Attorney General to intervene in the hearing as a party to
the matter. In such cases, only the court, court officials, prosecutor,
defendant, any legal representatives of the court, the Attorney General
and any court-authorised witnesses can be present at the hearing. 16
Exceptionally, if the court believes that disclosure could prejudice
national security, the COUli may order that the defendant, the legal
representative or the court official may not be present when details of the
information or the reasons for its non-disclosure are heard by the cOUli. 17
The cOUli must keep a record of the hearing, and make it available to any
appeal court, the prosecutor and the Attorney General. If the defence
legal representative has obtained a security clearance by the Secretary,
they can have access to the record.
The function of the hearing is to determine whether, having regard to the
Attorney General's certificate, there would be a risk of prejudice to
national security if the information was disclosed or the witness called. 18
The court must also consider whether the non-disclosure would affect the·
defendant's right to receive a fair hearing and other matters the court
considers relevant. The court is directed to 'give greatest weight' to the
Attorney General's certificate. 19 The court may make various orders
after deliberation. 20
14 National Security Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth) s
28(2).
15 National Security b?formation (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth) s 43
and s 44.
16 National Security b?!ormation (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth) s
29(2).
17 National Security Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth) s
29(3); the defence has a right to be heard on whether the information should be
disclosed or the witness called (s 29(4».
18 National Security b?!ormation (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth) s
31 (7).
19 National Security Infomwtion (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth) s
31 (8). These provisions are in sharp contrast with the more recent provisions of the
Anti-Tel7'orism Act (No 2) (2005) regarding control orders and preventative detention
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Constitutionality of Trial Provisions
The author submits there are grounds on which the constitutionality of the
above regime may be challenged. They will be discussed separately, as
they have been in the various judgments, though there is clear overlap in
the strands of reasoning to be discussed.
Broad Principle of Separation of Powers
The first suggested ground for a challenge to the above provisions is that
they breach the principle of separation of powers which is clearly
provided for in the Cotnmonwealth Constitution. 21 From the broad
principle flow some secondary principles which will also be considered in
this paper. It is axiomatic that the plinciple of separation of powers is
based primarily upon the guarantee of liberty.22 Two recent High Court
of suspected terrorists. The Attorney General is required to give hislher consent to an
application for a control order (s 104.2 Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) as amended by the
2005 Act), but the court is asked to consider a range of factors in deciding on the
application, including that the order would substantially assist in preventing a terrorist
act. Unlike the provisions being discussed here, the 2005 provisions do not direct the
court that the content of a certificate by a member of the Executive is the paramount
consideration in considering whether or not to grant the application made.
20 These include an order that the information not be disclosed at all, that a copy of the
information with the security sensitive material deleted be given (with or without a
summary of the deleted information or a statement of facts that the information would
be likely to prove), or that all of the information be disclosed (s 31(2), (4) and (5)).
21 R v Kirby; Ex Parte Boilermakers' Society of Australia (Boilermakers') (1956) 94
CLR 254; (1957) 95 CLR 529 is accepted as the leading Australian case to apply
Montesquieu's theory, but refer also to Harrison Moore The Constitution of the
Commonwealth o.lAustralia (2nd ed, 1910) 322-323 (to which Evatt J referred with
approval in Victorian Stevedoring and General Contracting Co Pty Ltd and Meakes v
Dignan (1931) 46 CLR 73,117); statements of the founding fathers collected in Fiona
Wheeler 'Original Intent and the Doctrine of the Separation of Powers in Australia'
(1996) 7 Public Law Review 96; Finnis 'Separation of Powers in the Australian
Constitution' (1967) 3 Adelaide Law Review 159; and George Winterton 'The
Separation of Judicial Power as an Implied Bill of Rights' in Geoffrey Lindell (ed)
Future Directions in Australian Constitutional Law (1994).
22 Kitto J put it this way inR v Davison (1954)90 CLR 353, 380-381:
It is well to remember that the framers of the Constitution, in distributing
the functions of govemment among separate organs, were giving effect to
a doctrine which was not a product of abstract reasoning alone, and was
not based upon precise definitions of the terms employed. As an
assertion of the two propositions that government is in its nature divisible
into law-making, executive action and judicial decision, and that it is
necessary for the protection of the individual liberty of the citizen that
these three functions should be to some extent dispersed rather than
concentrated in one set of hands, the doctrine of the separation of powers
as developed in political philosophy was based upon observation in the
experience of democratic states, and particularly upon observation of the
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decisions invalidating legislation breaching separation of powers
principles and offensive to human rights are thought to be apposite to the
legislation being considered here.
Of course, while it is easy to agree with the doctrine of separation of
powers, and the High Court has accepted the important distinction
between judicial and non-judicial power,23 it is more difficult to defIne
precisely what is meant by judicial power,24 given that many of its
features are not exclusive to judicial power. The statement of Griffith Cl
in Huddart, Parker and Co is at least a useful starting point:
The words 'judicial power' as used in s71 of the Constitution mean the
power which every sovereign authority must of necessity have to decide
controversies between its subjects, or between itself and its subjects,
whether the rights relate to life, liberty or property. The exercise of this
power does not begin until some tribunal, which has the power to give a
binding, and authoritative decision (whether subject to appeal or not) is
called upon to take action. 25
Acknowledging the potential diffIculties in coming up with an acceptable
meaning of judicial power, however, the High COUli has recently struck
out two laws which were held to compromise the role of judges in our
system of government and law-making.
In Chu Kheng Lim and Others v Minister for Immigration, Local
Government and Ethnic Affairs and Another,26 a provision of the
Migration Act 1958 (Cth}, s54R, had provided that' a court is not to order
development and working of the system of government which had grown
up in England.
This position was cited with approval in the joint judgment in Wilson v Minister for
Aboriginal and Ton'es Strait Islander Affairs (1996) 189 CLR I, 11-12 agreed
(Brennan CJ, Dawson Toohey McHugh and Gummow JJ). Refer also to George
Winterton 'The Separation of Judicial Power as an Implied Bill of Rights' in Geoffrey
Lindell (ed) Future Directions in Australian Constitutional Law (1994); Leslie Zines
'A Judicially Created Bill of Rights?' (1994) 16 Sydney Law Review 166; Geoffrey
Kennett'Individual Rights, The High Court and the Constitution' (1994) 19
Melbourne University Law Review 581, and Cheryl Saunders 'The Australian Federal
Judicial System' in Brian Opeskin and Fiona Wheeler (ed) The Australian Federal
Judicial System (2000). Both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(Article 14(1» and the European Convention on Human Rights (Article 6(1» require
that legal proceedings be conducted by an independent tribunal.
23 R v Kirby: Ex Parte Boilermakers' Society oj" Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254; Fiona
Wheeler 'The Boilermakers' Case' in H P Lee and George Winterton (ed) Australian
Constitutional Landmarks (2003).
24 The High Court in Precision Data Holdings Ltd v Wills (1991) 173 CLR 167, 188
recognised the difficulty; and see Re Tracey; Ex Parte Ryan (1989) 166 CLR 518, 537
(Mason CJ, Wilson and Dawson JJ).
25 (1909) 8 CLR 330, 357.
26 (1992) 176 CLR 1 (Lim).
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the release from custody of a designated person'. 27 A majority of the
com1 fOlmd the provision to be invalid. 28 Brennan Deane and Dawson JJ
in the majority found that the Constitution
(does) not pennit the conferral upon any organ of the Executive
Government of any part of the judicial power of the Commonwealth. Nor
do those grants of legislative power extend to the making of a law which
requires or authorises the courts in which the judicial power of the
COlmnonwealth is exclusively vested to exercise judicial power in a manner
which is inconsistent with the essential character of a court or with the
nature ofjudicial power. 29
It is submitted to be part of the essential character of a court to determine
what is necessary for a defendant to have a fair trial. A majority of the
High Court found in Dietrich v R that it is a constitutional requirement of
the trial of Commonwealth offences that the trial be a fair one, such that if
the trial were not fair, the court had jurisdiction to order a stay of
proceedings. 30 In that case the precise context was the claimed right to
government-funded legal representation if the accused could not afford
their own lawyer, but the principle is clearly of broader application. It is
for the court to make sure that an accused has a fair trial, as perhaps its
primary obligation in a criminal matter. It may be part of a com1's
inherent jurisdiction31 as a Chapter III court to stay proceedings which do
not reflect a fair trial, accepting this phrase is open to different
interpretation. Keith Mason identified four primary functions of a court's
27 A designated person was a prohibited non-citizen whose application for refugee status
had not been successful.
28 Brennan, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ; Mason CJ, Toohey and McHugh JJ
dissenting.
29 (1992) 176CLRl (Lim),27.
30 (1992) 177 CLR 292 per Mason CJ and McHugh J 'the right to a fair trial ... [is] a
central pillar of our criminal justice system' (298); per Deane J (326) 'the fundamental
prescript of the criminal law of this country is that no person shall be convicted of a
crime except after a fair trial according to law' (with which Toohey J at 361 agreed);
and Gaudron J (362) 'it is fundamental to our system of criminal justice that a person
should not be convicted of an offence save after a fair trial according to law'. Similar
sentiments appear in Jago v District Court (NSW) (1989) 168 CLR 23, per Mason CJ
(29), Deane (56), Toohey J (72) and Gaudron J (75), McKinney v The Queen (1991)
171 CLR 468, and Rv Macfarlane; Ex Parte O'Flanagan and O'Kelly (1923) 32 CLR
518,541-542, where Isaacs J referred to the 'elementary right of every accused person
to a fair and impartial trial'. Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, to which Australia is a signatory but upon which this country has not
legislated, confirms the right of an accused to have legal representation assigned to
them where the interests of justice require, in the event the accused cannot afford to
pay for it.
31 This argument is put by Wendy Lacey 'Inherent Jurisdiction, Judicial Power and
Implied Guarantees Under Chapter III of the Constitution' (2003) 31 Federal Law
Review 57.
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inherent jurisdiction, the first one being to ensure convenience and
fairness in legal proceedings. 32
However, it is submitted the National Security Information Act in effect
makes the fairness of the defendant's trial a subsidiary, rather than a
primary issue. This is because s 31, which allows a cOUli to cotlsider
whether or not to make a suppression order regarding particular evidence
in the interests of national security, requires the court to take account of
various matters in considering the application. While the defendant's
right to a fair trial is specifically mentioned as a factor in s 31 (7)(b), the
matter to which most weight must be given is the Attorney General's
certificate (which says by defmition that disclosure would be contrary to
national security and therefore should not occur).
This section is thus argued to be unconstitutional because it
e asks the court to exercise judicial power in a manner inconsistent
with the essential character ofjudicial power (including the right to a
fair trial);
.. subverts a principle that members of the High Court have previously
found to be a fundamental constitutional right to subsidiary status;
and
El gives primacy to another factor.
The fact that this factor is a certificate from the Executive will be
considered and is also thought to be objectionable. 33
Public Confidence in the Judiciary
As well as insisting on a separation between judicial and non-judicial
power, the doctrine of separation of powers has also been interpreted to
prevent powers being granted to a court of such a nature that might cause
public confidence in the impartiality of our courts to be questioned. 34
These principles were established most clearly by the Kable case. 35
32 Keith Mason 'The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court' (1983) 57 Australian Law
Journal 449; I H Jacob 'The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court' (1970) 23 CUl7'ent
Legal Problems 23. Mason CJ in Jago v District Court ofNew South Wales (1989)
168 CLR 23, 27-30 refen-ed to a court's inherent power to prevent their processes
being used in a manner which gives rise to injustice.
33 The author is reminded of the statement by Dixon J in the Communist Party Case
(Australian Communist Party v The Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR I) that 'history .,.
shows that in countries where democratic institutions have been unconstitutionally
superseded, it has been done not seldom by those holding the executive power' (187).
34 Public confidence is clearly related to the principle of separation of powers: Elizabeth
Handsley 'Public Confidence in the Judiciary: A Red Hen-ing for the Separation of
Judicial Power' (1998) 20 Sydney Law Review 183.
35 Kable v Director ofPublic Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR SI (Kable). The case
involved the Community Protection Act 1994 (NSW), which allowed the Attorney
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For example, Justice Gaudron stated that the Parliament could not confer
powers on a cOUli which are 'repugnant to or incompatible with the
exercise ofjudicial power'. 36 This would undermine public confidence in
the judicimy:
Public confidence in the courts requires that they act consistently and that
their proceedings be conducted according to rules of general application.
That is an essential feature of the judicial process. It is that feature which
serves to distinguish between palm tree justice and equal justice. Public
confidence cannot be maintained in a judicial system which is not
predicated on equal justice.37
Justice McHugh agreed the principle of separation of powers would strike
down laws that would 'undennine public confidence in the impartial
administration of the judicial functions of State courts'. Parliament could
not be given functions which might lead ordinary members of the public
to conclude that the State court as an institution was not free of
government influence in administering the judicial functions vested in the
court. 38 Gummow J found that cOUlis could not administer laws that are
'repugnant to the judicial process in a fundamental degree' and which
undermined the appearance of impartiality and maintenance of public
confidence. 39 Toohey J said that laws, which are so offensive that public
confidence in the integrity of the judiciary was diminished, could not be
countenanced. 40
The judges fOlmd that the Act's unusual procedural provisions,
challenged in the Kable case, were one of the ways in which the Act
tmdennined public confidence in the judiciary. Gaudron J commented on
the tmiqueness of the proceedings, and rules which applied only to this
legislation.41 McHugh J noted that the ordinmy rules of evidence had
General of that State to apply to the Supreme Court for an order that Kable be detained
for a further period following the completion of his current jail tem1, if the Supreme
Court were satisfied he was more likely than not to re-offend. A critique of the Kable
decision appears in Elizabeth Handsley 'Public Confidence in the Judiciary: A Red
Herring for the Separation of Judicial Power' (1998) 20 Sydney Len,' Review 183; refer
also to Fiona Wheeler 'The Rise and Rise of Judicial Power Under Chapter III of the
Constitution: A Decade in Overview' (2000) 20 Australian Bar Review 283.
36 Kable v Director ofPublic Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51 (Kable), 104.
37 Kable v Director ofPublic Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51 (Kable), 107.
38 Kable v Director ofPublic Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51 (Kable), 116-117.
39 Kable v Director ofPublic Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51 (Kable), 133.
40 Kable v Director ofPublic Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51 (Kable), 98. Refer
also to Grollo v Palmer (1995) 184 CLR 348; Wilson v The Minister (1996) 189 CLR
1, 11 and Maxwell v The Queen (1996) 184 CLR 501, 534.
41 Kable v Director o[Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51 (Kable), 108.
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been substantially relaxed. 42 These factors contributed to a finding that
public confidence in the independence of the judiciary was being
undermined by the legislation in that case, because it helped create a
perception that the judiciary was part of an executive plan to imprison
certain offenders.
The author suggests that similar reasoning might apply to s 31 of the
National Security Information Act. The argument is that the provision
requires a court to perfonn a function inconsistent with the nature of
judicial power. The provisions are again highly unusual, in that they
could potentially lead to a situation where the accused is not given the
detail of infonnation or evidence given to the court to support the charge
against the accused. Of course, this would have the effect of
compromising the ability of the defendant to cross-examine any witnesses
who gave this infonnation to the court, or to otherwise test the veracity of
the evidence given or led against the accused. Could these unusual
provisions not also be said to create a perception that the judiciary was
part of an executive plan to imprison certain offenders, by denying them
fundamental rights to which all other accused persons have an
expectation? If judges are worried about the rules of evidence not being
applied in a trial, as at least some of the judges in the Kable case were,
presumably they would also be concerned with legislation that potentially
denies the accused the right to even hear or see the evidence. 43
Gaudron J elaborated on her understanding of the requirements to
maintain public confidence in the judiciary in Wilson: 44
Public confidence depends on two things. It depends on the courts acting in
accordance with the judicial process. More precisely, it depends on their
acting openly, impartially and in accordance with fair and proper procedures
for the purpose of determining the matter in issue by ascertaining the facts
and the law and applying the law as it is to the facts as they are public
confidence in the independence of the judiciary is diminished if judges
perfonn functions which place them or appear to place them in a position of
subservience to either of the other branches of government.
In the author's opinion, consistently with the views of Gaudron J, a court
cannot be asked in one breath to consider a matter, but in the next breath
42 Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51 (Kable), 120;
section 17(3) of the Act stated that despite any act or law to the contrary, the court
must receive certain kinds of evidence in relation to the offender Kable.
43 Writing extra-judicially, Justice Kirby has written that 'defending, even under assault,
and even for the feared and hated, the legal rights of suspects (is a way) to maintain the
support and confidence of the people over the long haul', 'Australian Law - After 11
September 2001' (2001) 21 Australian Bar Review 253,263.
44 Wilson v Ministerfor Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs (1996) 189 CLR 1,
22,25.
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be told that the view of the Attorney General on the matter is the
overriding consideration. That does, with respect, appear to place judges
in a position of subservience to the executive in a way that cannot be
reconciled with fundamental aspects of the Commonwealth Constitution.
It infringes upon the primary duty of a judge in a criminal trial, namely to
ensure that the trial is a fair one. It is offensive to Chapter III of the
Constitution and clearly has the potential to undermine public confidence
in our federal courts.
Independence of Judicial Function
A further (related) strand of reasoning apparent in the Kable decision, as
well as its predecessor Lim, 45 is the principle that the Executive cannot
interfere with the exercise of judicial power. Judicial independence is
guaranteed, although. the author must concede that the so-called minimum
requirements for judicial independence have never been clearly
articulated by the full High Court. 46
Accepting this unceliainty, the general principle of independence is
accepted. As Brennan Deane and Dawson JJ put it in Lim
[i]t is one thing for the Parliament, within the limits of the legislative power
conferred upon it by the Constitution, to grant or withhold jurisdiction. It is
a quite different thing for the Parliament to purport to direct the courts as to
the manner and outcome of the exercise of their jurisdiction. The fonner
falls within the legislative power which the Constitution, including Chapter
III itself, entrusts to the Parliament. The latter constitutes an impennissible
intrusion into the judicial power which Ch III vests exclusively in the courts
which it designates. 47
45 Chu Kheng Lim v Minister jar Immigration (1992) 176 CLR 1.
46 Northern Australia Aboriginal Legal Aid Service v Bradley (2004) 206 ALR 315 per
Gleeson CJ: 'there is no ideal model of independence and both historically and at the
present time, arrangements capable of affecting independence have varied [amongJ
Australian institutions'; per McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon
JJ 'no exhaustive statement of what constitutes the minimum in all cases is possible'.
Gleeson CJ then refers to statements of what the Canadian Supreme Court has
regarded as minima, in Valente v The Queen [1985J 2 SCR 673; Reference Re
Remuneration ofJudges of the Provincial Court ofPrince Edward Island; Reference
Re Independence and Impartiality ()/Judges ()f the Provincial Court ofPrince Edward
Island [1997J 3 SCR 3 (including security of tenure, salary level, and control over
administrative procedures). Refer also to Stephen Parker 'The Independence of the
Judiciary' in Brian Opeskin and Fiona Wheeler (eds), The Australian Federal Judicial
System (2000).
47 (1992) 176 CLR 1, 36-37. Their Honours confirmed that legislative power did not
extend to the making of a law which requires or authorises the courts in which the
judicial power of the Commonwealth is exclusively vested to exercise judicial power
in a manner which is inconsistent with the essential character of a court or with the
nature of judicial power (27). Harrison Moore put it in a similar way, concluding that
'any interference with the essentials of judicial administration is a deprivation of
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Similar sentiments are evident in the Kable case48 as well as in the
pronouncements of superior courts of other nations. 49 It is considered
that this legislation also serves to interfere with the independence of the
judiciary,50 as a direction to the court as to the manner and outcome of
the exercise of its jurisdiction. The COUlt would not accept such laws in
Lim; it should not in this case.
The Queensland Court of Appeal applied these principles in the Re
Criminal Proceeds Confiscation Act 2002 (Qld) case. 5 ! There s 30 of the
Act required the COUlt to hear a State application for a restraining order
regarding property in the absence of the person whose property was the
subject of the application. Williams JA, with whom White and Wilson JJ
agreed, found the section was unconstitutional based on the Kable
principle. As Williams JA noted,
[t]he Supreme Court is making the initial (restraining) order must also be
satisfied that the 'public interest' is not such as to require the court to refuse
to make the order. How could a judge possibly be so satisfied in the
exercise of judicial power when the only entity entitled to place material
before the court on which a judgment on that issue could be formed was the
State .. , Asking a judge to make a decision on such issues ... makes a
judicial power' (The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia (1910) 323.
Similarly, in 1986 the High Court drew a distinction between legislation interfering
with the judicial process itself (unacceptable) rather than with the substantive rights at
issue in the proceedings (acceptable): Australian Building Construction Employees'
and Builders Labourers' Federation v Commonwealth (1986) 161 CLR 88, 96 (Gibbs
CJ, Mason, Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ).
48 Eg Gaudron J (l03) 'Ch II1 requires that the Parliaments of the States not legislate to
confer powers on State courts which are repugnant to or incompatible with their
exercise of the judicial power of the Commonwealth'; McHugh J (109) found the Act
invalid because it vested functions in the Supreme Court that were incompatible with
an exercise ofjudicial power by that court. Refer also to Nicholas v The Queen (1998)
193 CLR 173 per Brennim CJ (185), Gaudron J (210), McHugh J (221), Kirby J (265)
and Hayne J (278).
49 In United States v Nixon (1974) 418 US 683, 709 the Supreme Court was clear that
'[t]he very integrity of the judicial system and public confidence in the system depend
on full disclosure of all the facts, within the framework of the rules of evidence'; and
elsewhere 'The legitimacy of the judicial branch ultimately depends on its reputation
for impartiality and non partisanship' (Mistretta v United States (1989) 488 US
361,407; Macmillan Bloedel Ltd v Simpson [1995] 4 SCR 725, 749-750 (Supreme
Court of Canada». Refer also to Article 14(1) of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (to which Australia is a signatory), and Article 6(1) of the
European Convention on Human Rights.
50 As indicated, this is not dissimilar to a finding that public confidence in the judiciary
has been undermined - public confidence in the judiciary is being undermined because
it is considered their independence has been compromised. However, these different
strands have been maintained for the purposes of this article since the Courts have
recognised them as such.
5] [2003] QCA 249.
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mockery of the exercise of the judicial power in question. The statutory
provision removes the essential protection of the citizen inherent in the
judicial process. Effectively the provision directs the court to hear the
matter in a manner, which ensures the outcome, will be adverse to the
citizen and deprives the court of the capacity to act impartially. 52
It is suggested that the effect of the provisions of the National Security
Information Act is similar, in providing for the possibility that the accused
may not see or hear the case made against him by the Commonwealth,
and may not have the right to cross-examine any witnesses used by the
prosecutor. Surely the effect of such rules is to help ensure that the
outcome of the case will be adverse to the accused - the legislation asks
the accused to fight the charge with one ann tied behind their back.
Further, while the law in the above case was bad enough in tenns of
denying property rights without proper hearing, the law under
consideration here denies different rights (or may do so) in a criminal
context. The right to due process53 is fundamental in any trial, but surely
when the liberty of a subject is at stake, it is even more important than in
a trial which might affect (merely) property rights.
In Nicholas v The Queen,54 Gaudron J set out her understanding of the
minimum requirements necessary in order that the independence of a
Chapter HI court be maintained. These words require restatement here:
Consistency with the essential character of a court and with the nature of
judicial power necessitates that a court not be required or authorised to
proceed in a manner that does not ensure equality before the law,
impartiality and the appearance of impartiality, the right of a party to meet
the case made against him or her, the independent determination of the
matter in controversy by application of the law to facts determined in
accordance with the rules and procedures which truly permit the facts to be
ascertained and, in the case of criminal proceedings, the determination of
guilt or innocence by means of a fair trial according to law. 55
If the 'right of a pariy to meet the case made against him or her' is
fundamental, how can it not be breached by legislation that contemplates
the accused not being aware of the details of the evidence used against
52 Re Criminal Proceeds Confiscation Act 2002 (Qld) [2003] QCA 249, [57].
53 Deane J has noted the separation of judicial power as the Constitution's only general
guarantee of due process, see Re Tracey; Ex Parte Ryan (1989) 166 CLR 518, 580, but
also see Leeth v Commonwealth (1992) 174 CLR 455 per Deane and Toohey (487) and
Gaudron J (502-503); Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1; and Cheryl
Saunders 'Concepts of Equality in the Australian Constitution' in Geoffrey Lindell
(ed) Future Directions in Australian Constitutional Law (1994). The right to due
process will be further discussed later in the article.
54 (1998) 193 CLR 173.
55 Nicholas v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 173,208-209.
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him or her? One could also argue that denying the accused the right to
cross-examine denies the court the opportunity to truly ascertain the facts
of the case, and clearly compromises the ability of the accused to obtain a
fair trial. To the extent that this law operates to make parts of a case
secret, an attack on it may be justified fmiher by refening to the judgment
of Priestley JA (dissenting) in John Failfax Pty Ltd v Attorney G~neral
(NSW). 56 There His Honour was satisfied that provisions requiring that
certain trials proceed in camera and were not reportable were inconsistent
with the exercise of Chapter HI judicial power, compromising its
independence and integrity.
It may be thought that the relevant provisions of the National Security
Information Act 2004 (Cth) relate merely to the procedure of the case,
such that the reasoning of the majority in Nicholas 57 applies. There the
Federal Parliament passed a law to the effect that in detennining whether
a drug offence had occurred or not, the fact that an investigating officer
had committed an offence in the process of securing evidence against the
accused (entrapment) did not render evidence inadmissible for that
reason, in some cases. The majority found the law to be valid,
recognising the ability of Parliament to make rules of evidence that
affected proceedings. The court found that laws regulating the burden or
method of proving facts were not objectionable. 58
However, it is submitted that this legislation is quite different to that
considered in Nicholas. The Government is not merely changing the
procedural rules of evidence, which it clearly is entitled to do; it is
substantively allowing (and encouraging) the court to deny the accused
the right to hear evidence being used against them. It is allowing (and
encouraging) the court to deny the accused the right to cross-examine or
test evidence led by the prosecution. 59 It so 'encourages' by directing the
court that the most impOliant consideration in exercising their discretion
is that the Attorney General has issued a certificate that disclosure of the
evidence would compromise national security. The author submits that
such provisions do impinge on public perceptions of whether a fair trial
has been conducted, and whether or not the court is independent of the
executive. The fact that a trial has been conducted fairly is not a desirable
56 (2000) 181 ALR 694,721-722.
57 (1998) 193CLR 173.
58 Brennan Cl, Toohey, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ; McHugh and Kirby JJ
dissenting.
59 The High Court reiterated in 1986 that interference with the judicial process itself was
unacceptable: Australian Building Construction Employees' and Builders Labourers'
Federation v Commomvealth (1986) 161 CLR 88, 96 (Gibbs Cl, Mason, Brennan,
Deane and Dawson JJ).
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extra; it goes to the heart of the judicial process and cannot be relegated
to subsidiary status. 60
It is true that legislation commonly provides for various factors that a
cOUli should take into account when exercising its discretion. No one
could object to such regulation on Kable grolillds. This was confirmed
recently in the Fardon case, where the appellant sought to rely on the
Kable principle to invalidate legislation providing for the preventive
detention of a past sexual offender (in similar vein to the Kable Act). The
court in Fardol1 considered legislation which asked the court to consider
various factors in hearing the application for continued detention, the
most important of which was deemed to be 'community protection', as it
had been declared also in the Kable Act. However, the High Court in
Fardol1 found the law was valid. 61
One might think tllat the legislation here, in directing the court to take
account of different factors in deciding whether or not to allow the
evidence to be made available to others (including the accused), might be
similarly lillobjectionable, according to the Court. However, this
argun1ent would ignore that while in Kable and Fardol1, the paramount
consideration was said to be 'community protection', in the legislation
being discussed here, the paramount consideration is said to be the
content of a celiificate from a member of the Executive. It is submitted
this creates an unsavoury impression that a judge is being directed in his
or her discretion by the Executive, in an unacceptable manner. It is surely
unlikely iliat a judge would defy such a certificate, and the unacceptable
perception is surely created that a judge's independence has been
compromised, and he or she is being asked to do the bidding of the
Commonwealth. 62
60 Gaudron J in Leeth v Commonwealth (1992) 174 CLR 455 reiterated that all judicial
power had to be exercised in accordance with the judicial process. A legislative
direction requiring the court to exercise its powers other than in accordance with that
process would be invalid for that reason. The author believes this law asks a judge to
exercise judicial power inconsistently with the judicial process.
61 Fm"don v Attol71ey General (Queensland) [2004] 210 ALR 50; as to which see
Anthony Gray 'Standard of Proof, Unpredictable Behaviour and the High Court of
Australia's Verdict on Preventive Detention Laws' (2005) 10 (1) Deakin Lmv Review
177.
62 This perception is not avoided by allowing a court later to declare that proceedings
under the Act be stayed on the ground that the accused did not get a fair hearing (s
19(2)).
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Right to a Fair Trial/Natural Justice
Related63 to the above strand of reasoning is another which insists on the
right of a person to a fair trial. 64 As indicated, the rights-sourced basis of
the principle of separation of powers is clearly accepted. 65 It is trite law
to say that the right to a fair trial is seen as fundamental in the
administration of criminal law. 66 There remains debate about whether the
right is guaranteed by the Constitution. 67 It is hard to see that denying the
accused the opportunity to see or hear evidence against them, as well as
denying the right to cross-examination, is a fair process. 68 As President
of the New South Wales Bar Association Ian Barker QC puts it
63 It may be argued that protection of judicial process is an implied constitutional
principle in Chapter HI of the Constitution. Implicit within the protection of judicial
process may be a right to a fair trial: Christine Parker 'Protection of Judicial Process
as an Implied Constitutional Principle' (1994) 16 Adelaide Law Revieu' 341. Parker
refers for support to a statement by Deane J in Po(vukhovich v Commonwealth (1991)
172 CLR 501 that the very purpose of separating judicial power into Chapter HI courts
is so that the power can be exercised in accordance with judicial process (606).
64 Refer to Fiona Wheeler 'The Doctrine of Separation of Powers and Constitutionally
Entrenched Due Process in Australia' (1997) 23 (2) Monash University Law Review
248; Fiona Wheeler 'Due Process, Judicial Power and Chapter HI in the New High
Court' (2004) 32 Federal Law Review 205.
65 Wilson v Ministerfor Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs (1996) 189 CLR 1,
11 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ); though some see it
more as part of the inherent jurisdiction of the court to prevent abuse of process:
Wendy Lacey 'Inherent Jurisdiction, Judicial Power and Implied Guarantees Under
Chapter III of the Constitution' (2003) 31 Federal Law Review 57.
66 If any authority is needed, refer to the judgment of lsaacs J in R v Macfarlane; Ex
Parte O'Flanagan and Kelly (1923) 32 CLR 518,541-542 (describing the elementary
right of every accused person to a fair trial, as a right 'which inheres in every system of
law that makes any pretension to civilisation'); see also Barton v The Queen (1980)
147 CLR 75 and McInY)is v The Queen (1979) 143 CLR 575. This has specifically
been deemed to include the right to a fair opportunity to answer the case made against
the accused (In Re Hamilton; In Re Fon'est [1981] AC 1039, Bonaker v Evans (1850)
16 QB 162, 171). All members of the High Court agreed in Dietrich v The Queen
(1992) 177 CLR 292 that an accused had a right to a fair trial (Mason CJ and McHugh
J (311), Brennan J (323), Deane J (326), Dawson J (343), Toohey J (353), and Gaudron
J (362».
67 Refer to Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292; Gaudron J stated in Re Nolan; Ex
Parte Young (1991) 172 CLR 460 that 'Chapter III provided a guarantee, albeit only
by implication, of a fair trial of those offences created by a law of the Commonwealth'
(496). Kirby J in John FaiTfax v Doe (1995) 130 ALR 488, 515 observed that the
requirement of a fair trial may be implied into the Constitution, and Murphy J
suggested it without deciding (The Queen v MacKellar; Ex Parte Ratu (1977) 137
CLR 461,483).
68 Somewhat perversely, s 19 of the Act claims to uphold the power ofa court to conduct
proceedings so as not to lead to an abuse of process, 'except so far as this Act
expressly or impliedly provides otherwise'. Does this betray an admission that the
drafter was aware that the provisions of the Act can be seen as an abuse ofprocess?
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[t]he idea that information might be used by the prosecution without the
accused seeing the information need only be stated for its offensiveness to
basic notions of fairness and justice to be apparent. 69
Unfortunately, this is what the legislation contemplates.
Judgments of the High Court in Dietrich support this argument. If Deane
J was worried in that case that the lack of legal representation might mean
the accused will be brought to a trial to face a trial process 'for which he
will be insufficiently prepared', 70 presumably the same concern would
arise in a case where the accused has not been allowed to hear the case
against him. If Gaudron J noted cases where evidence had to be excluded
because 'its weight and credibility cannot be effectively tested', 71
presumably Her Honour would have difficulty with a proceeding where
the accused may not conceivably have even seen or heard the evidence,
let alone tested its credibility. Consistently with its finding in Dietrich,
the High Comi should not countenance such provisions.
As indicated, such legislation allows the possibility that the accused not
have the opportunity to cross-examine a witness called for the
prosecution. Yet the right to cross-examine a witness has been declared
on many occasions to be fundamental. 72 Refeni.ng to the above cases,
Heydon J (a member of the High Comi of Australia) concludes
[n]o evidence given by one party affecting another party in the same
litigation can be made admissible against the other party, unless there is a
right to cross-examine. 73
While the High Court has recognised that Governments may have a right
to withhold documents from a comi on the basis of public interest,74 and
69 lan Barker 'Human Rights in an Age of Counter Terrorism' (2005) 26 Australian Bar
Review 267.
70 Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292, 335. The first sentence in Deane J's
judgment refers to the fundamental right of an accused person to a fair trial according
to law (326).
71 Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292, 363, citing McDermott 11 The King (1948)
76 CLR 511-515 (per Dixon J), R v Lee (1950) 82 CLR 133. The first sentence in
Gaudron J's judgment also refers to the fundamental right of an accused person to a
fair trial according to law (362).
72 Allen v Allen [1894] P 248, 254; Lord v Colvin (1855) 3 Drew 222; 61 ER 888; R v
Hadwen [1902] 1 KB 882; Lonnlrvist v Lonnkvist [1952] WN 88; Rigby v Woodward
[1957] 1 All ER 391; Blaise v Blaise [1969] 54.
73 Cross on Evidence: Seventh Australian Edition (2004) 548. Refer also to Andrew
Ligertwood Australian Evidence (3rd ed, 1998) 503 'The right to cross-examination is
fundamental and granted to each and every party to the proceeding', referring to s 27
of the Evidence Act (Cth) which gives a party the right to question any witness, except
otherwise provided in the Act.
74 Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1; Gilligan v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (1990) 101
FLR 139, 149.
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has recognised the possible link between national security and secrecy, 75
it has indicated that it will be more reluctant to accept such an argument
in criminal trials. In Sankey, Gibbs ACJ stated
If State papers were absolutely protected from production, great injustice
would be caused in cases in which the documents were necessary to support
the defence of an accused person whose liberty was at stake in a criminal
trial; and it seems to be accepted that in those circumstances the docume~ts
must be disclosed. 76
Gibbs ACJ also made clear in the case that it was the duty of the court,
and not the privilege of the executive government, to decide whether a
document would be produced or withheld. This seems at odds with the
direction in the National Security Information Act that in deciding what
the interests of justice require, the most important factor is the certificate
from the Attorney General stating that disclosure would be contrary to
national security interests.
One could also cite numerous administrative law authorities to support
such a proposition. The words ofMason J are clear:
It is a fundamental rule of the common law doctrine of natural justice
expressed in traditional tenns that, generally speaking, when an order is to
be made which will deprive a person of some right or interest in the
legitimate expectation of a benefit, he is entitled to know the case sought to
be made against him and to be given an opportunity of replying to it. 77
It is hard to see that these provisions are consistent with the requirements
of natural justice. While some judges have found that natural justice may
not be required in the exercise of statutory functions,78 certainly it is
fundamental to judicial proceedings, and (of course) most fundamental of
all when criminal proceedings and an individual's liberty are involved. 79
In recent cases we have seen explicit acknowledgement by members of
the High Court that a failure to accord an accused natural justice may
75 Attorney General (United Kingdom) v Heinemann Publishers Australia Pty Ltd (1988)
165 CLR 30, 46 (Spycatcher Case).
76 Emphasis added. Gibbs ACJ cited for this proposition Duncan v Cammell Laird and
Co [1942] AC 624, 633-634; Conway v Rimmer [1968] AC 910, 966-967, 987; R 11
Lewes Justices: Ex Parte Secretary of State for Home Department [1973] AC 388,
407-408.
77 Kioa 11 West (1985) 159 CLR 550,582, to like effect Brennan J (628) and Deane J
(633). Mason J specifically rejected the proposition, in State of South Australia 11
O'Shea (1987) 163 CLR 378, 389 that the fact a case involves political or policy
judgment means that natural justice is not applicable.
78 Salemi 11 MacKellar (N02) (1977) 137 CLR 396 and The Queen 11 Mackellar; Ex Parte
Ratu and Another (1977) 137 CLR 461.
79 Deane J in Re Tracey; Ex Parte Ryan (1989) 166 CLR 518, 581 noted that the
'guarantee involved in the vesting ofjudicial power exclusively in Chapter III courts is
at its most important in relation to criminal matters'.
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contravene the requirements of Chapter HI of the Constitution and affect
the accused's right to a fair trial. 80 In Leeth v Commonwealth, Mason CJ,
Dawson and McHugh JJ observed that
any attempt on the part of the legislature to cause a court to act in a manner
contrary to natural justice would impose a non-judicial requirement
inconsistent with the exercise ofjudicial power. 81
The author submits that according to this test, the relevant provisions of
the National Security Information Act should be struck out as being
contrary to the requirements of Chapter HI of the Constitution.
Interestingly from a policy perspective, some psychological literature has
found that criminal enforcement works best when administered in a way
that their targets perceive as procedurally fair. Others have referred to the
capacity of people to accept social control that delivers bad outcomes to
them, provided they know those outcomes are dispensed through
processes they accept as fair. Authors have concluded that deterrence
effects (of anti-terrorism laws) will exceed defiance effects (those that
create the will to break such laws) when the sanctions are seen as an
outcome of fair procedures. 82
Some International Perspectives on the Right to a Fair Trial
These views are reinforced when provisions of international law are
considered. Given its universal importance, it is not surprising that the
requirements of a fair trial are set out with some specificity in
international law. Article l4(3)(d) of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights requires that an accused have the right to be tried in
his presence, and para (e) gives the accused the right to examine, or have
examined, the witnesses against him/her. 83 Article 6(3)(a) of the
European Convention on Human Rights requires that an accused be
informed promptly and in detail of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him; be given adequate time and facilities for the preparation of a
80 Deane J in Re Tracey; Ex Parte Ryan (1989) 166 CLR 518, 580 noted that section 71
was the Constitution's only general guarantee of procedural due process.
81 (1992) 174 CLR 455,470. Gaudron J has agreed that the judicial process involves
(amongst other things) the application of the rules of natural justice (Harris v Caladine
(1991) 172 CLR 84, ISO; and Re Nolan: Ex Parte Young (1991) 172 CLR 460,496).
The Leeth case is further discussed by Jeremy Kirk 'Constitutional Implications (II):
Doctrines ofEquality and Democracy (2001) 25 Melbourne University Law Review 24.
82 Refer to John Braithwaite 'Pre-Empting Terrorism' (2005) 17(1) Current Issues in
Criminal Justice 96,97, summarising the work of Tyler (1990) Why People Obey the
Law.
83 Australia has ratified but not enacted this treaty.
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defence, and that the accused has a right to examine witnesses. 84 The
author does not believe that the Australian provisions discussed in this
article are consistent with these internationally recognised rights. Of
course, there remains debate about the extent to which our Courts should
be guided by developments in international law in interpreting the
Constitution,85 including the requirements of the principle of separation
ofpowers.
Similarly, in judgments of the United States Supreme Comi,86 we have
seen an initial acceptance of the unfettered right of the military and
government to determine who might pose a threat to the nation (justifYing
the enforcement of curfews and exclusion from United States tenitory)87
eventually give way to a re-assertion of judicial review even when the
defence of the country is at issue. In Hamdi v Rumsfeld,88 the United
States Government sought to continue the detention of Hamdi at
Guantanamo Bay on the assertion that he had received training in
Afghanistan and was affiliated with a Taliban military unit. He was said
to be an enemy combatant of the United States. The Supreme Court
insisted that the accused be given his due process rights, including the
notice of the factual basis for his classification as an enemy combatant,
and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's factual assertions before
a neutral decision maker. 89 The court accepted the view of Murphy J
84 Refer also to the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), incorporating this Convention into
United Kingdom law.
85 Eg Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 208 ALR 124, especially McHugh J (140-145) and
Kirby J (163-174).
86 The author accepts that the United States decisions are based on a due process
. provision in that country's Constitution that has no express equivalent in the Australian
Constitution, but re-iterates the view of some members of the High Court that an
implied right to due process exists in our Constitution. United States authorities are as
a result considered highly relevant.
87 Hirabayashi v United States (1943) 320 US 81; Korematsu v United States (1944) 323
US 214.
88 (2004) 542 US 507 - for further discussion of these cases see Eugene Rostrow 'The
Japanese-American Cases - A Disaster' (1945) 54 Yale Law Journal 489; Mark
Tushnet 'Defending Korematsu: Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime' (2003)
Wisconsin Law Review 273. The Australian equivalent cases are discussed presently.
89 (2004) 542 US 507, [11]; the court noted these principles were of long-standing,
quoting Baldwin v Hale (1864) I Wall. 223,233; Fuentes v Shevin (1972) 407 US 67,
80: 'parties whose rights are affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they
may enjoy that right they must first be notified; it isequaJly fundamental that the right
to notice and an opportunity to be heard must be granted at a reasonable time and in a
meaningful manner'; An17strong v Manzo (1965) 380 US 545; Mullane v Central
Hanover Bank and Tntst Co (1950) 339 US 306; and Cleveland Board ofEducation v
Loudermill (1985) 470 US 532, 542: 'an essential principle of due process is that a
deprivation of life, liberty or property be preceded by notice and opportunity for
hearing appropriate to the nature of the case'. In a related way, the United States
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(dissenting) in the Korematsu case that judicial review applied to military
claims, as it did with all other claims. 9o It concluded in Hamdi that
[t]he threats to military operations posed by a basic system of independent
review are not so weighty as to trump a citizen's core rights to challenge
meaningfully the Government's case and to be heard by an impartial
adjudicator. 91
Indeed, the Declaration of Independence expressly refers to the separation
ofpowers in a military context,92 as one of the reasons for the decision of
the then thirteen states to sever ties with Great Blitain.
Similar issues arose in the United States recently with the trial against
Zacarias Moussaoui, an alleged conspirator in the September 11 attacks.
The accused requested the Federal Government give him access to others
they had detained in relation to the attacks, because he believed they had
useful infonnation that would assist his case. The Federal Government
refused, citing national security. The United States Court of Appeals was
unanimous in holding that the Govemment's national security interest had
to yield to the accused's right to a fair trial. 93
Supreme Court has found that the failure of the prosecution to give to the accused
information that relevantly affects the credibility of the prosecution case also infringes
the accused's due process rights: Giglio v United States (1972) 405 US 150; Brady v
Mwyland (1963) 373 US 83.
90 Korematsu v United States (1944) 323 US 214, 233-234: 'the military claim must
subject itself to the judicial process of having its reasonableness determined and its
conflicts with other interest reconciled'.
91 (2004) 542 US 507, [12]. The court referred to its previous decisions in Mathews v
Eldridge (1976) 424 US 319; Heller v Doe (1993) 509 US 312; Zinermon v Burch
(1990) 494 US 113; United States v SalenlO (1987) 481 US 739; Schall v Martin
(1984) 467 US 253; Addington v Texas (1979) 441 US 418. The court reiterated that it
was during the most challenging and uncertain times that the nation's commitment to
due process was most severely tested, and that a United States court had to maintain at
home the principles for which the nation was fighting abroad ((2004) 542 US 507,
[10]). To like effect were the comments ofDixon J in the Australian Communist Party
v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1, 187-188 that 'history ... shows that in countries
where democratic institutions have been unconstitutionally superseded, it has been
done not seldom by those holding the executive power ... the power to legislate for the
protection of an existing form of government ought not to be based on a conception ...
adequate only to assist those holding power or resist or suppress obstruction or
opposition or attempts to displace them or the form of government they defend.
Further discussion of the Communist Party case appears in George Winterton 'The
Significance of the Communist Party Case' (1992) 18 Melbourne University Law
RevieVl' 630.
92 'He [the King of Great Britain] has affected to render the Military independent of and
superior to the Civil Power'.
93 United States v Moussaoui (2004, Court of Appeals 4th Circuit, 03-4792, 22/4/2004,
citing the United States Supreme Court decision in Arizona v Youngblood (1988) 488
US 51,55 for the proposition; and to like effect Roviaro v United States (1957) 353 US
53,60-61.
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In an effort to balance these competing considerations, the Comi of
Appeals allowed the witness evidence to be taken by remote video from
an undisclosed location. The court was prepared to consider an
application for a substitution of the deposition testimony of witnesses,94
provided Moussaoui had input into the creation of the substituted material
to check context and accuracy, that the jury (in a case like Moussaoui)
was made fully aware that the substitutions were based on what the
witness would say if they were in the court room, that the substitutions
were obtained in circumstances making it likely they are accurate, and
that neither the paIiies nor the court has ever had access to the
witnesses. 95 Suffice to say, none of these minimal prescribed protections
insisted upon by the United States Court of Appeals appear in the
Australian legislation.
Similar to the American experience, previous High Court decisions have
indicated a reluctance to second-guess Govermnent decisions on military
matters. In Lloyd v Wallach 96 the High Court validated legislation
enabling the making of a declaration of a Minister that a citizen was
disloyal, resulting in that person's possible indefinite detention. The
Comi found it could not question the basis on which the Minister found
his belief. 97 The continuing COlTectness of such an approach must be
questioned, even in wartime, in light of subsequent developments. 98 Of
course in CUlTent times, perhaps best summarised as uneasy peace, there
is even less scope for such draconian provisions.
In summary on the international material, it is submitted the High Court
would do well to take notice of, and follow, the insistence of the United
States Supreme Court on due process rights, even for those accused of the
most serious crimes. Certainly the danger of telTorism to Australia must
be rated lower than the danger of telTorism to the United States.
However, that country's highest court has admirably stood finn against
attempted intmsions by the executive on long-established civil liberties.
The High Court of Australia must abandon its previous deference to the
94 However, on the facts the Court found the Government's suggested arrangements to be
unsatisfactory.
95 The judgment in that case itself had been edited, with security sensitive information
deleted from the judgment, appearing as * * * *.
96 (1915) 20 CLR 299.
97 Griffith CJ (305), Isaacs J (309), Higgins J (313); (Gavan Duffy, Rich and Powers JJ
concurred (314)); refer also to Little v Commonwealth (1947) 75 CLR 94 and Ex Parte
Walsh (1942) ALR 359.
98 Australian Communist Par(v v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1; their correctness was
expressly questioned by Kirby J in Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 208 ALR 124, 166
though McHugh J in the same case seemed to confirm their continued correctness
(140).
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judgment of the Executive, even in times of great uncertainty and security
risk.
Conclusion
The High Court should strike out those pmis of the National Security
Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth) which
contemplate a certificate being given by the Attorney General that
evidence to be led in a trial will compromise national security if released,
as a precursor to a judge making a decision that the evidence or testimony
will compromise national security if released and should as a result be
suppressed. It should strike out the provisions because:
11 they infringe the principle of separation ofpowers;
e they undennine public confidence in the judiciary;
@ they compromise judicial independence;
l!l they interfere with the role of a court to make sure that an accused
has a fair trial;
«I they are inconsistent with the established principle of natural justice;
and
@ there is strong support for the above principles in international law,
and the United States Supreme Court has refused to allow the right to
due process to be subordinated in the supposes interests of national
security in a context where the security risk is greater than in this
country, in a stand that has much to commend it.
